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This study aims to analyze the strong state of Sri Lanka that emerged after the 
civil war during the regime of Mahinda Rajapaksa. The Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was the leading Tamil militant social force, which was 
waging war against the government to form a separate state in the northern and 
eastern regions of Sri Lanka. The government ended both the separatist 
struggle of the LTTE and the civil war in May 2009 by winning a major 
military victory. This study is a qualitative analysis based on text analysis and 
field interviews, supplemented with limited observations. The study reveals 
that the state introduced enhanced security measures to avoid possible LTTE 
regrouping and re-commencement of violence in the country. The state also 
attempted to fragment minority parties to weaken the state reconstitution 
process through penetration and regulation of the social order. 
 
 
Keywords: 
civil-war; 
consolidation; 
minority; 
society; 
state; 
 
International research journal of management, IT and social sciences ©  2020. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). 
 
Corresponding author: 
Mohamed Anifa Mohamed Fowsar,  
Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science,  
Faculty of Arts and Culture, South Eastern University of Sri Lanka. 
Email address: fowsarma@seu.ac.lk    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
a  Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts and Culture, South Eastern University of Sri Lanka 
b  Department of Political Science, South Eastern University of Sri Lanka 
IRJMIS                  ISSN: 2395-7492     
Fowsar, & Fazil. (2020). Strong state and weak minority in post-civil war Sri Lanka: A study based on state-in-
society approach. International Research Journal of Management, IT and Social Sciences, 7(6), 72-78. 
https://doi.org/10.21744/irjmis.v7n6.1013 
73 
 
1   Introduction 
 
The highly centralized unitary model of the Sri Lankan state structure was inherited from the British colonial master’s 
reproduction of the Westminster model of parliamentary government which was centralized both politically and 
administratively. The multiple ethnic nature of Sri Lankan society and the unitary feature of the state have been 
fundamental grounds for state and society contestation in the post-colonial era. There is an argument that focuses on a 
paradox in which the state introduces policies in favor of the majority Sinhalese masses and undermines policies in the 
direction of another domain of the Tamil minority. The Sinhalese political elites had established a special relationship 
and favor for their people to earn support in the election which promoted Sinhala nationalism and the state’s domination 
towards Tamils. This state alliance with Sinhalese society provided the opportunity for the formation of a majoritarian 
‘strong state’ in the post-colonial period.  
The Tamil community’s experience of discrimination and political exclusion had produced a particular project of 
minority aspiration that transformed into a demand for federalist regional autonomy. Sinhalese political elites had 
repeatedly and consistently failed to see the growing crisis of the state despite demands made by the Tamil minority 
social forces to reconstitute the post-colonial Sri Lankan state. Politics of the majority such as the centralization of 
unitary state power and counter politics of the minority such as the promotion of secession, both mutually transformed 
state, and social relations. The immediate circumstances that saw the transition of Tamil ethnic politics from a demand 
for regional autonomy to secession evolved in the late 1970s. Tamil youths rose and formed several armed groups in 
the line of Tamil nationalist ideology, to establish a separate state called Tamil Eelam (Carment et al., 2006; 
Balasingham, 2004; Wilson, 2000).  
The LTTE was one of the many militant organizations that took up arms against the Sri Lankan state. The LTTE 
was a strong social force that had been able to capture and control substantial parts of the Sri Lankan territory. The 
LTTE acted like the sole representative of the Tamil minority, and most of the people also accepted them. The LTTE’s 
alliance with local Tamil people and wings of Diaspora led to the attempt for reconstitution of state during the war 
period. To understand puzzling issues, the existence of the LTTE in the last three decades brought it as a social force 
of Tamils and a voice of theirs which shaped and formed a strong Tamil society. The civil war between the LTTE and 
government forces came to a bitter end in May 2009, after nearly three decades, when the LTTE was comprehensively 
defeated by the Sri Lankan government (Hoglund & Orjuela, 2011). With the defeat of the LTTE, the entire island 
came under state control which transformed the state into a strong unitary state once again, and Tamil Society 
weakened. The end of the war evolved with a strong state and a weak Tamil society. It is a very difficult juncture in 
which to reconstitute a strong state via the contestation of weak post-LTTE Tamils. 
 
 
2   Materials and Methods 
 
The state-in-society approach described by Joel S. Migdal was applied to this study to discuss the contestations between 
the state and its minority community in post-war Lanka. According to Migdal (2013), the state-in-society approach is 
significant because it inspires us to examine not only those everyday social forces that challenge, shape, and 
reconstitute the authority of the state, but also the deep-seated ideational norms that simultaneously perpetuate the 
authority of the state over enormous geographic spaces (a far less systematically explored dynamic). The instruction 
to decenter state authority while simultaneously retaining the normative idea of the state as a core unit of analysis 
distinguishes. Migdal’s state-in-society approach from those of his contemporaries in the field of everyday politics. 
The approach presented by Migdal offered insight within the political discipline. He also led to a slew of researchers 
directly inspired by his work and the blueprint to conduct a novel study on the relationship and dynamics between the 
state authority and our everyday life (Fazil, 2019a). 
This is a qualitative study based on text analysis and field interviews, supplemented through the observations 
subjected to limitations. In this section, the author discusses the methodology and its relevance to Sri Lanka. The main 
stakeholders of the state-minority contestations in Sri Lanka were considered as the key categories in this study, 
specifically, the state and society (minority). These key categories can be further divided into several sub-categories. 
Qualitative data are collected and analyzed and used as bases for these key categories. These categories with a wide 
range of interests in mind were selected to gather maximum variations in responses to obtain views from diverse 
perspectives.  
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The two selected key categories were two national actors to cover the state and minority stakeholders of the 
contestations. The local or national key categories are all living in Sri Lanka, but they manifest different political 
positions, hierarchical structures, ethnicity, religion, and culture. The author employed purposeful sampling when 
selecting the respondents. The data used in this research corresponds to an extensive literature survey to collect all 
relevant data on post-independent state formation and state-minority contestations that occurred in the country, 20 in-
depth qualitative interviews (conducted during November 2015–April 2016 and an additional interview in April 2017), 
supplemented with a process of limited field observations and reflections. The two-step approach was followed for the 
qualitative data collected during the period 2013 to 2017.  
The critical and interpretative approaches were used for data analysis, and the study combined the empirical 
methods, classified, and weighed from sources such as interviews, observations, and field notes. The extract transcribed 
data were processed for consistency and coherency in a descriptive theme to help the study to conclude. Thus, this 
paper reviews the reasons why the state has not responded with inclusive policies to prevent another major conflict. It 
examines the image presented by and the actual practices of the state of Sri Lanka to avoid inclusive policies designed 
to accommodate the Tamil minority into the state system, after the end of the civil war and defeat of the secessionist 
militant social force (Fearon & Laitin, 2011; Sharma, 2006). 
 
 
3   Results and Discussions 
 
Migdal (1988), argues that “for a state to survive and be able to gain strength, it has to have the ability to mobilize the 
society and have the capability to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and use resources 
appropriately. Strong states are those with high capabilities to complete these tasks, while weak states find it difficult.” 
Migdal (1988), also points out that there should be skillful leadership as an important condition for creating a strong 
state. In the case of Sri Lanka, Rajapaksa was a skillful leader to form a strong post-war state. His credibility and mass 
appeal as a political leader raised because of ending the civil war against the LTTE. He was also successful in proving 
his capability to mobilize the people to vouch for him that helped him to emerge victorious in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections held in 2010 (De Votta, 2010). These two electoral contests; the presidential election on 
January 26, 2010, and parliamentary election on April 8, produced huge social mobilization and the people provided 
extended support to Rajapaksa and his United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition. Incidentally, the UPFA 
consisted of political and ideological forces that had in the past stood for the oppressive perspectives of unitarism and 
devolution in the state reconstitution of Sri Lanka.  
The war led the unitarist state to reform its perspective to gain an ideological and political upper hand within the 
UPFA regime. The parties in support of President Rajapaksa’s bid for a second term included hard-line parties such as 
the JHU, Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP – People’s United Front), and last but not least the National Freedom 
Front (NFF), the party that denied the existence of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and also opposed the system of 
provincial councils. The need for power-sharing arrangements with ethnic minorities at the regional level was refuted 
by these parties, and they were in support of a strong executive presidency on the argument that it was a safeguard 
against future attempts at secession (Marcelline & Uyangoda, 2013). President Rajapaksa at the end of the civil war 
forwarded his quest to rebuild a fresh path for the state in line with unitary rule favoring his strongman style of politics 
(Wickramasinghe, 2009; Vineyard, 1957; Wootters & Fields, 1989; Allahyari et al., 2018). 
For creating a strong state, the emergence and growth of such radical social forces within the Sinhalese majoritarian 
politics were important. To make his regime stronger, he also had the support of the pro-devolution left parties as well 
as the ethnic minority parties. This included the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), the Tamil Makkal 
Vidutalaipulikal (TMVP), All Ceylon Muslim Congress (ACMC), and the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC). All of 
them continued to argue the need for a sustainable political solution to the ethnic conflict (Marcelline & Uyangoda, 
2013). These minority social forces were not by any means a replacement for the defeated LTTE and hence were 
unable to contest with the state. This enabled the formation and continuation of a strong state by Rajapaksa. 
Consequently, the lack of political balance of forces within the UPFA regime disrupted the opportunity for state 
transformation and reconstitution. A strong state should have the capability to penetrate society and regulate social 
relationships (Migdal, 1988).  
The strong state used the post-war situation to its favor to maximize its ability to penetrate the Tamils who were in 
disarray and aimed to deregulate their social relationships in the northern and eastern provinces. As a result of the long 
drawn out war, Tamil society was an extremely affected and vulnerable community. They had lost loved ones, property, 
and livelihood got displaced, and became refugees (Fazil, 2019b). The state increased its capacity and set up certain 
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tools to penetrate society and regulate social relations. First, the organization and mobilization of Sri Lanka Security 
forces (SLSF). Upon becoming President Rajapaksa took office as the Defence Minister and assigned secretary of the 
Defence Ministry to his brother Gotabhaya, a former officer in the military, and this led to a remarkably close 
connection between the civilian and military commands (De Votta, 2009a).  
General Sarath Fonseka played a major role to defeat the LTTE in the Rajapaksa regime. In the post-war situation, 
General Fonseka claimed not to have supported Gotabhaya in utilizing the army for the malpractices and extrajudicial 
purposes. Gradually, Fonseka was side-lined, removed from the post of the army chief, and alienated in the military 
activities of the state. General Fonseka went on to join the opposition and contested the January 2010 presidential 
election which he lost. With his election loss, Sarath Fonseka was politically victimized by the Rajapaksa regime. He 
was due to be charged rather cunningly, in both military and civilian courts. 
The state’s main concern was the threat of post-LTTE Tamils’ regrouping and restarting the conflict. For that 
reason, “both the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Terrorism Investigation Department (TID) were 
strengthened, and also paramilitary group members (TMVP, EPDP, Karuna faction, etc.) and ex-combatants 
amalgamated with CID and TID. Members of CID, TID, and their support wing were assigned to stay together with 
people in the former LTTE-controlled villages or areas. They penetrated society to monitor ex-combatants and worked 
as a shadow to regulate their social relationships. They occasionally visited and investigated ex-combatants to monitor 
their relationship with youths, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), foreigners, media personals, 
and researchers” (personal communication, March 17, 2016). “The state had suspicions that ex-combatants could 
betray the military secret of war crime activities during the final battle and about the shortage of post-war peace-
building activities which could easily reach the international human rights organizations and media” (personal 
communication, December 12, 2015). State security divisions not only monitored the ex-combatants but were also 
suspicious of civilians such as youths, government servants, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) representatives, 
media personnel, and local politicians. These regulatory activities denied a return to normalcy in the former war-torn 
areas (personal communication, March 16, 2016) 
“The state tightened security by establishing new navy camps and army camps in focal points to avoid arm 
trafficking and police stations to maintain civil administration. Civilians in these areas felt insecure due to the presence 
of security forces and complained and submitted requests to the state directly as well as via area politicians; however, 
there were no noticeable changes taking place” (personal communication, March 21, 2016). 
In the meantime, “the state introduced other security strategies within the North, East and other parts of the country 
by dividing SLSF into separate teams along with other paramilitary groups whose roles entailed abduction, assault, 
robbery, extortion, imprisonment, murder, and disappearances, though the notorious white vans. White van targets 
included media personnel, businessmen, ex-combatants, politicians, social workers, NGO representatives, and any 
other persona non-grata of the regime” (personal communication, February 13, 2017). 
The state, meanwhile, introduced a lot more measures where they focused primarily on the north and eastern areas. 
Their primary aim was to ensure; the paramilitary is not only tasked with securing the war-torn regions for the state 
but also to morphing them into so much into “grease devils”. This phenomenon was coined to instill fear where they 
were described as naked or semi-naked men smeared in grease allegedly assaulting women across the north and eastern 
areas. Attacks were frequently recorded, leading to demonstrations and local population reprising (Goodhand, 2012).  
The state’s constant attempt to weaken the state’s reconstitution ideology was construed by working towards 
fragmenting the affected populace through various policies. By penetrating the society to overtake them, to regulate 
them eventually, the state intended to control the region under their political and social grip. During the war, local 
Tamil politicians and parties such as All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation 
Front (EPRLF) (Suresh Wing), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), and Tamil United Liberation Front 
(TULF) formed a coalition. They made them the sole political representative of the Tamil people. This coalition, 
commonly known as TNA continues in that role into the present day. It rewarded them with substantial seats in the 
parliamentary elections (Mayilvaganan, 2008). 
In the aftermath of the parliamentary election of January 2010, the TNA won 14 seats, the highest number of seats 
for a single party from the North and East, and also began to move towards a more reconciliatory position with the 
UPFA government. Significantly, at the parliamentary elections of 2010, the TNA dropped from the electoral list to 
those candidates who were seen to be pro-LTTE and instead chose candidates who held seemingly moderate views. In 
its more conciliatory approach, the TNA emphasized that there was a trust deficit between itself and the government 
and wanted to address it. Central to the TNA argument was the point that a move away from antagonistic politics 
would facilitate their inclusion in the reconstruction and development process in the North and East, and in a political 
process towards power-sharing. This change of approach of the TNA appeared to be based on the understanding that 
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the end of the civil war, and the end of the LTTE, had transformed the political framework for a debate on state 
reconstitution requiring new strategies for dealing with the Sinhala political elite (Marcelline & Uyangoda, 2013). 
During the civil war, the LTTE in its quest for alternative sovereignty had framed the minority rights discourse within 
the conceptual framework of external self-determination. 
The TNA tried to re-design the Tamil political plan within the framework of devolution of power, in the new post-
civil war political context in which the LTTE no longer shaped the minority rights discourse. There was a shift in 
policy from a pre-civil war period to a post-civil war one. In the pre-civil war period, the ethnic Tamil project for equal 
recognition and power-sharing was based on a demand for internal self-determination in the form of a federal 
arrangement. Whereas in the post-civil war context, the Tamil project seems to have a more significant commitment 
to reforming the Sri Lankan state than to secession. This shift is seen in the consensus among all Tamil parties to 
advance their politics of group rights through a federal arrangement or a system of enhanced powers to the provincial 
council. The Indian constitutional arrangement of power-sharing and policies of affirmative justice, or positive 
discrimination for disadvantaged communities, are cited as examples to draw (Marcelline & Uyangoda, 2013). 
On the one hand, the ruling class attempted to weaken TNA, Tamil mainstream political part, and aligned with 
anti-LTTE parties of EPDP and TMVP in Tamil politics. The Sri Lankan state was now in a position to use these anti-
LTTE Tamil satraps to show intra-Tamil divisions (De Votta, 2009b) to the international community and use them to 
strengthen state survival and for the dilution of the TNA’s demand for post-war state reconstitution. To further 
strengthen a strong unitary state and consolidate power, the ruling UPFA accepted other minority parties such as CWC 
to join as a coalition. Finally, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) crossed over from opposition leading to the 
2/3rd majority it needed to pass the amendment, backing the 18th Amendment (Marcelline & Uyangoda, 2013). 
Thirdly, radical outfits and hate campaigns were getting promoted within the ruling coalition. It was a prominent 
voice of dissent the NFF, a breakaway faction of the Jantha Vimukthi Peramuna  (JVP), and its leader Wimal 
Weerawansa. This faction was encouraging further centralization of state power on the basis that federalism was the 
only demand of Tamil politicians and not that of the common Tamil people (Daily Mirror, 2009). 
Another constituent member of the government, the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU – Sinhalese National Heritage 
Party), held a similar view. Despite being junior partners of the UPFA coalition with only three MPs between them, 
both these radical parties were ideologically influential in shaping the UPFA’s policies on the ethnic conflict and war. 
The JVP on the other hand, while promoting the argument for post-conflict economic development and reconciliation, 
called on the government to block all attempts to devolve power based on the 13th Amendment (Daily Mirror, 2009, 
June 1, pp. 1 & 6, as cited in Marcelline & Uyangoda, 2013). In the meantime, researchers and observers attest to the 
mechanization of the state behind the radical elements in the country during the last phase of the previous regime. The 
Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) and Sinhala Ravaya were encouraged to promote hate campaigns against the minority and state 
reconstitution project to find a resolution to the ethnic conflict. 
Thus, the state and its potential leader implemented these survival strategies to penetrate society and regulate social 
relationships for the continuation of a strong unitary state and soft authoritarianism in post-war Sri Lanka, making the 
state reconstitution demand of the minorities meaningless. 
Migdal (1988 & 2001), suggests another strategy of the strong state is to extract resources and use those resources 
appropriately. This theory of Migdal’s state-in-society approach can be applied to the post-war strong state’s recovery, 
reconstruction, and development activities under the peace-building process. During the civil war, the land was 
demarcated under the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA). The Sri Lankan state-controlled their area while the LTTE-
controlled its area. Accordingly, with the defeat of the LTTE, the state recaptured land, sea, and other resources and 
dominated entire areas of the island on its path to strengthen the strong state of Sri Lanka. Jayawardena (2009) 
demonstrates how the state developed misconceptions among the majority Sinhalese and mobilized them against 
minorities’ demand for the reconstitution of the unitary state (self-determination): 
An article published in the Sunday Times FT on September 25, 2009, under the title ‘ISGA Eyes Lion’s Share’ 
“effectively pointed out that the LTTE was trying to take control of a major portion of Sri Lanka’s marine, maritime 
offshore, and natural resources. It is a great blessing that the ISGA (Interim Self Governing Authority) was not 
implemented by the then government and if so the rest of the country would have been subservient to an independent 
state of Tamil Eelam. Now that the LTTE menace is over, we must look at the development of natural resources in the 
eight districts – Amparai, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, and Vavuniya. These 
districts are about 18,323 sq. km or about 30 % of the total land area of 65 000 sq km of Sri Lanka. The population of 
these districts according to the last census carried out in 1995 is 2.6 million which is about 10% of the total population 
of Sri Lanka estimated at 19 –20 million. Therefore those who advocate traditional homelands for one community 
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should realize that 10 % of the population in the country occupies nearly 30 % of the land area and the rest of the 90 
% occupy the balance 70 %, and no one can dispute this highly inequitable distribution.” 
The state incorporated all the resources from north and east into the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It 
gained revenue which during the LTTE period did not fully contribute to the national economy. These include paddy 
cultivation, vegetables, and fruits, including grapes, seafood, forestry, water resources, etc., and mineral resources with 
the major resource being the heavy mineral sands at Pulmoddai. Sea resources include deep-sea fishing and Miocene 
limestone, where there are large cavities etc. (Jayawardena, 2009). 
“The LTTE maintained financial administration in their controlled areas and established the Tamil Eelam Bank 
with several branches. Civilians deposited a lot of money and pawned jewelry at the so-called banks during the civil 
war. At the end of the war, SLSF captured huge amounts of money and valuable kilos of jewelry in the north” (personal 
communication, December 3, 2015). These activities of the state can be described as the extraction of resources from 
the LTTE and Tamil people. It can be argued here that the extracted money and jewelry belongs to the Tamil people. 
It was expected that the state would return these belongings of innocent people in the aftermath of the war. However, 
in reality, only some people were identified by the army and had their jewelry distributed to them after five years since 
the termination of the war. Some 1,960 identified owners from Mannar, Vavuniya, Mullaithivu, and Kilinochchi 
received their belongings, according to presidential officials (Firstpost, 2014). There is a crucial question placed before 
the state as to ‘what happened to the balance jewelry?’ Is it difficult to find sources about the accountability of people’s 
money and what happened to it?. 
 
 
4   Conclusion 
 
This paper aims to project attention towards the fact that the end of the war created a golden opportunity to reconstitute 
the state away from a unitary model to a more open and flexible state system. The state could have been adopted a 
more inclusive policy in the post-war era. However, the will to implement the reconstitution of the state was thwarted 
and abandoned at the most opportune moment. President Rajapaksa, who formed a strong post-war government, has 
exploited his popularity as a leader who defeated the LTTE, for his political mileage. The masses swayed by his 
proposition; the people thronged as a flock to vote for him, cementing his fame among the political and Sinhalese 
majority elites. His government, according to Migdal’s theory, merged the position of the state as a rigorous structure 
that worked rapidly to weaken the minorities. Through the imposition of various political and social regulations 
favoring the majoritarian state, it nullified the minorities’ concerns in the post-war context.  There were various 
strategies deployed to penetrate the society, regulate socially established structures, and dismantle minority political 
parties by fragmenting them. In line with this approach, the TNA who were the keen proponents of the federal system 
were positively nudged to accept the coalition by a few concessions that didn’t affect the majority. It led the TNA to 
concede by making them drop pro-LTTE sentiments in their party. The government carefully crafted alignment with 
anti-LTTE Tamil parties such as Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) and Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal 
(TMVP). Through these crafted approaches, the state merged with the establishment of centralized economic 
development. The state machinery was stoking the sentiments of the majority through radical anti-minority parties and 
propagating hate campaigns. They covertly promoted their agenda. It deemed the extraction of resources from the 
northern and eastern areas and redistribution acceptable by the government and followed it as a state policy. 
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